Consider a monopolist in one market that faces competition in a second market. Bundled loyalty discounts, in which customers receive a price break on the monopoly good in exchange for making all purchases from the monopolist, have ambiguous welfare effects. To analyze such discounts as predatory pricing is incorrect. In some settings, they act as tie-in sales. Existing tests for whether such discounts violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act do not track changes in consumer surplus or total surplus. We present a new test and use it in an illustrative example based on SmithKline that assumes the "tied" market is a homogeneous good. If the tied market is characterized by Hotelling competition, bundling by the monopolist causes the rival firm to reduce its price. In numerical examples, we find that this can deter entry or induce exit.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bundled loyalty discounts provide price breaks on one or more products to buyers that remain sufficiently loyal to a supplier. They resemble volume discounts in that shifting incremental purchases from a rival supplier may allow a buyer to satisfy a loyalty requirement and thereby enjoy lower prices.
They resemble tying when affordable prices for one (tying) product are available only to consumers that are completely loyal to the supplier in their purchases of a second (tied) product. Like volume discounts and tying, bundled loyalty discounts can enhance or diminish consumer surplus and total welfare by improving the ability to price discriminate, and they can change the long run incentives for single-product firms to enter/exit. Open questions include under what conditions should competition authorities treat bundled loyalty discounts like tying or predatory pricing, and when do bundled rebates enhance welfare. LePage's, Inc. et al. v The facts in LePage's begin with the very strong brand name of Scotch tape, a 3M product. Most retail merchants believed that they had to offer Scotch tape. Until the early 1990's, 3M's share of the U.S.
Bundled loyalty discounts have recently received considerable attention in antitrust circles in light of
discount-adjusted price of the competitive product exceeds its cost, then the bundled discount pricing strategy is deemed not anti-competitive.
The great interest in LePage's probably stems from the fact that bundled rebates are a widespread business practice. Until LePage's, the Ortho test was an accepted way of analyzing bundled discounts.
The Court of Appeals' decision in LePage's, however, leaves matters in doubt. To quote the U.S.
Department of Justice:
…The court of appeals was unclear as to what aspect of bundled rebates constituted exclusionary conduct, and neither it nor other courts have definitively resolved what legal principles and economic analyses should control.
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Employing a bundled loyalty discount imposes switching costs on customers because a customer that shifts some purchases to a rival seller pays a higher unit price for the quantity still purchased from the incumbent. In VAA/BA, Virgin Atlantic proposed an incremental sales test to judge the legality of such pricing plans. This test compares the competitor's incremental revenue from making those new sales to the customer to the competitor's incremental cost. Because the competitor must compensate the customer for the switching cost, net incremental revenue may be forced below incremental cost. In such a setting, "incremental" competition is unprofitable and is deterred by the loyalty discount plan. The VAA/BA test simply checks whether net incremental revenue exceeds incremental cost, and if it does, the loyalty discount plan is presumed legal. Like Ortho, this test analyzes bundled rebates using predation case law.
The academic economics literature on bundled discounts is rather sparse. Bundling for the purpose of price discrimination has a large literature, but usually in a monopoly setting. The main exception is Nalebuff (2004a) , who has written extensively on how bundling can be used to reduce competition. Discounts that apply to every unit purchased have a smaller literature. Kolay, Shaffer, and Ordover (2004) examine a monopolist's use of all-units discounts on a single product, and compare them to menus of two-part tariffs. Greenlee and Reitman (2004) analyze loyalty discounts, both with and without bundling. In a duopoly differentiated products setting in which both firms can offer a loyalty program to a retailer that sells to consumers with varying tastes, they show that firms pass the VAA/BA test in equilibrium. Thus failing the VAA/BA test suggests that a firm has goals other than short-term profit maximization. In a setting similar to LePage's, they show that the introduction of bundled discounts causes standalone prices to rise. The welfare effects of bundled rebates in Greenlee and Reitman (2004) are ambiguous, since their models allow for price discrimination across consumer types. 11 Nalebuff (2004b Nalebuff ( , 2005 together contain results similar to Theorems 1 and 2 below, under the assumption that the tied market is perfectly competitive. We relax this assumption in part of our analysis.
From the standpoint of antitrust enforcement, it is unclear what body of case law best applies to bundled discounts. The approaches of the Ortho test and the VAA/BA incremental test suggest that bundled rebates should be analyzed as a method of predation. In LePage's, 3M argued vigorously in its appellate briefs that its discounts were legal under Brooke Group because even its discounted prices were above cost, an assertion not challenged by the plaintiff.
However, because the intent of bundling is to induce consumers to buy multiple products from a single seller, perhaps tying is a more appropriate way to look at bundled discounts. Indeed, the Third Circuit suggested this in LePage's, but went no further. It is worth noting that in LePage's and in Ortho, the firm offering the loyalty program included in the bundle a product over which it had either a monopoly (Ortho, due to patents) or a very strong brand name (Scotch tape, in LePage's). Monopoly goods within the bundle, then, may play the role of tying products. As we show below, however, bundled discounts are not always equivalent to tying.
While our focus is on the short term competitive effects of bundled loyalty discounts, a full analysis of bundled rebates would also consider the longer term implications as new competitors contemplate entry and/or incumbent competitors consider exit. Similar to tying, bundled rebates can change the terms on which firms compete in the linked market. As we will discuss, however, the manner in which bundled rebates influence the dynamics of competition differ from the effects of tying.
11 Their model includes small consumers that are not eligible for a loyalty program. Small consumers are always harmed by the introduction of a loyalty program, but this loss may be balanced by surplus gains to large consumers. For alternative analyses and commentary, see also Carlton (2001) and Tom et al. (2000) .
To summarize, this paper provides preliminary answers to two main questions. First, what is the correct legal framework to use in the antitrust analysis of bundled loyalty discounts? Second, how can one distinguish between bundled discounts that benefit consumers from ones that do not?
We reach the following conclusions.
• When the tied market is perfectly competitive, bundled discounts resemble tying and are not a form of predatory pricing.
• Bundled discounts can raise or lower consumer welfare. In either case, equally efficient competitors may be foreclosed. Profit-maximizing bundled discounts lower consumer surplus when the tied market is perfectly competitive.
• If products in the tied market are homogeneous, simple price comparison tests exist that can distinguish bundled rebates that raise consumer surplus from those that do not.
• These tests, applied to SmithKline, suggest that the bundled discounts at issue there probably lowered consumer surplus and total surplus.
• If the rivalrous market is a differentiated product duopoly rather than characterized by homogeneous goods, bundled discounts are not equivalent to tying. In such cases, profitmaximizing loyalty programs have ambiguous welfare effects, and aggregate consumer surplus can rise or fall due to bundling. This suggests that bundled discounts should not always be analyzed as tying arrangements.
• In the differentiated product settin g, bundled discounts reduce rents for the non-bundling firm.
Numerical examples indicate that bundled discounts can deter entry or induce exit.
The remainder of this article is organized in the following manner. Section II introduces our base model of a monopolist in one market that faces perfect competition in a second market. Sections III and IV discuss existing tests of bundled discounts and introduce a generalized test. Section V applies this test to SmithKline. Section VI briefly looks at nonlinear pricing and establishes that a monopolist benefits from offering a menu of bundled "three-part tariffs" that is not feasible without bundling. Section VII modifies the initial model by making the second market a differentiated duopoly. Section VIII concludes. An important assumption throughout is that consumer surplus is positive in market A at the monopoly price. This rules out the possibility that firm 1 extracts the entire consumer surplus via a twopart tariff. Less-than-full rent extraction can occur for a variety of reasons including contract incompleteness and demand uncertainty. When contracts cannot completely specify the terms of exchange, the joint surplus of the supplier and retailer depends on the parties' relative bargaining power, so rent extraction typically is less than complete.
12 When demand for the monopoly product is stochastic, the optimal two-part tariff does not extract all expected surplus from market A. Under this interpretation, Consult Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003) , including their discussion of the empirical study of branded tuna pricing by Kadiyali et al. (2000) . 13 See Mathewson and Winter (1997) and Brown and Sibley (1986) . We address demand uncertainty in Section VI.
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To establish terminology, a price pair ( )
is a bundled loyalty discount if it is available to consumers only on the condition that they buy everything from firm 1. Firm 1 also sets a standalone price for A, which a consumer pays if he or she buys B from a competitor. The price of A in the bundle is discounted from the standalone price. We imagine an initial situation in which firm 1 prices independently across markets, setting prices at ( )
. Subsequently, firm 1 offers a bundled discount plan, consisting of bundled prices and a standalone price for A. This paper studies the effects of this pricing innovation.
We consider, in turn, independent pricing by the monopolist and a loyalty program that consists of a standalone price A P and a price pair ( )
. A consumer that participates in the loyalty program receives an A ε discount on all its purchase of A whenever it agrees to make all of its B purchases (at price B B c P > ) from firm 1. Faced with these alternatives, the consumer decides whether to participate in the bundled rebate program and makes purchases accordingly.
A. Pareto-Improving Bundled Rebates
One theme of this article is that bundled rebates, with or without a share-based loyalty feature, can improve or harm welfare. To see how welfare may increase, suppose that initially there is independent pricing, firm 1 charges 
Equally efficient competitors are foreclosed in market B.
Proof. See Appendix. For ease of exposition, we have assumed no uncertainty in the demand curves for A and B. With this modeling simplification, bundled discounts are unnecessary whenever the monopolist can set a twopart tariff that extracts all surplus in A. As Mathewson and Winter (1997) establish, however, tying can improve profits when demands for A and B are uncertain but correlated. With stochastic demand, the optimal two-part tariff does not extract all surplus in A, and tying allows the monopolist to flexibly extract additional consumer surplus when demand is high. In Section VI, we introduce uncertainty by having the consumer's demand be a random variable (high or low) whose realization is unobserved by firms. If demand realizations for A and B satisfy non-crossing and uniform ordering properties, then firm 1 earns strictly greater profit when it offers a menu of bundled "three-part tariffs" (consisting of an entry fee, a discounted price for A, and a discounted price for B) than when it offers a menu of separate two-part tariffs for A and prices competitively in B. Thus with demand uncertainty, bundled discounts are not redundant to a monopolist that can offer two-part tariffs.
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The purpose of stating Theorems 1 and 2 separately is to provide a means of distinguishing bundled rebate plans that lower consumer welfare from those that do not. For example, one could compare the effective price of the monopoly good in the bundle to its price under a pre-existing independent pricing regime. If there is no difference, then the bundled rebate plan cannot be Pareto-improving, since Pareto-improving discount plans involve at least a small reduction in the price of the monopoly good (Theorem 1). Such a pattern of no price change for A would be consistent with Theorem 2.i. If the price of A in the bundle is lower than the pre-existing independent price, this is consistent with both Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. To distinguish between them, compare the standalone prices. Under Theorem 1, the standalone price is simply the pre-existing monopoly price, while under Theorem 2.ii the equilibrium standalone price is higher. The only cases left to consider involve the standalone price being less than * A P , which is not optimal for firm 1. Thus, even though the bundle price of B is above marginal cost, the net consumer effect is seen just by comparing A P and * A P . 16 Naturally, applying these tests requires price data for well-defined periods preceding and following the introduction of bundled rebates.
One may object that Theorem 1 is of little relevance because the monopolist can increase its profits by raising the standalone price above the initial monopoly price. The implication is that one would never expect to see a standalone price no higher than the pre-bundling monopoly price. One response is that, nonetheless, firms may behave in this manner. 3M, for example, claimed consistently that its bundled discount prices were all lower that its pre-bundling prices and that the standalone prices were simply the pre-bundling prices, with subsequent adjustments for cost increases.
17 At a minimum, if Model 1 applies, the condition * A A P P ≤ could be used as a safe harbor in antitrust enforcement.
III. EXISTING TESTS OF BUNDLED REBATES
As argued above, bundled rebates are not equivalent to predation, so the case law involving Brooke Group is unlikely to be directly useful in antitrust enforcement. Rather, for settings resembling Model 1, bundled rebates are best viewed as a form of tie-in sale. That said, the case law on tying does 16 It would be tempting to apply this test to LePage's. Unfortunately, the prices required are not available in the public record. For a discussion, including the approach presented here, consult Rubinfeld (2005) . 17 See Rubinfeld (2005:253) . 18 Of course, a shrewd monopolist may initially set its monopoly price artificially high in order to reach such a safe harbor after introducing a bundled loyalty discount program. not provide convenient rule of reason tests for the competitive effects of bundled rebates, and tying often has ambiguous welfare effects. 19 This test is equivalent to determining whether pricing for A and B under the bundled rebate is "compensatory" as introduced by Ordover and Willig (1981) . Ordover served as an economic expert for the plaintiff in Ortho. See also Nalebuff (2004c) . 20 The test that we propose above, though, has a similar theoretical problem: any bundled discount plan that passes it, given Theorem 1, cannot be maximizing profits. 21 In this respect, the Ortho test once again resembles cost tests for predation. 22 For more on how both our test and the Ortho test can be used as a safe harbor for legitimate conduct, see Greenlee and Reitman (2005) .
The VAA/BA incremental profit test also merits discussion. Share-based discounts can exist within a bundle of prices or can apply to an unbundled single product. Parsing the term "bundled rebates," it appears that for homogenous goods it is the bundling of discounted prices that has importance for competition, not whether the discounted prices within the bundle are share-based. While a loyalty discount program may make it unprofitable for equally efficient competitors to win incremental business, such firms can compete effectively for the consumer's entire requirements. Thus, with homogenous products, a bundled discount program can flunk the VAA/BA test, yet not reduce competition, consumer surplus, or total surplus. Hence, the usefulness of the VAA/BA incremental test in the present context appears limited.
23 By contrast, the price comparisons described above involve equilibrium prices and can distinguish bundled rebates that raise consumer welfare from those that lower it. Neither the Ortho test nor the VAA/BA test can do this, even in principle.
IV. EXTENSIONS AND VARIATIONS OF MODEL 1
A.
Non-Independent Demands
Our discussion has assumed independent demands for A and B. This facilitates characterizing the optimal bundled and standalone prices. For the more limited (but still important) purpose of determining whether a newly introduced bundled discount strategy raises or lowers consumer surplus, we do not need this assumption.
Suppose that the introduction of a bundled discount causes no change in the price of B. Hence, before using * AA PP > to infer anything, the analyst should try to verify that the bundling firm is maximizing profits. Alternatively, if the bundled price is sufficiently high that * AAA PP ε −>, then the bundled discount unambiguously diminishes consumer surplus and total surplus. This qualification does not affect the positive inference to be made when
B. Two Firms in the Competitive Market
So far, we have assumed that the non-monopoly market is perfectly competitive. This assumption ensured that the equilibrium prices of firm 1's market B rivals are not affected by firm 1's pricing strategy. Nothing changes if there is only one market B rival, provided that the B products are homogeneous and firms can set prices for B-only customers that differ from the bundle price for B. 24 The equilibrium in such cases has firm 1 setting loyalty program prices in a manner that makes the consumer indifferent between accepting the program and purchasing only B at cost, and firm 2 (the sole market B rival) setting price at marginal cost.
The duopoly results change if the firms cannot distinguish consumers that purchase A and B from those that purchase only B, or if the firms cannot prevent resale. Here, we briefly discuss how the analysis changes for this version of our first model, and examine it more deeply in a differentiated products setting in Section VII. With the assumption of homogenous goods, both firms price B at marginal cost in equilibrium absent a loyalty discount program. Introducing a bundled loyalty discount can only cause firm 1's price of B to rise, and firm 2 may respond optimally by increasing its price. In such instances, a test in the spirit of the above is still useful. If the standalone price of A under bundling is higher than the pre-bundling monopoly price of A, then Theorem 2 implies that consumer surplus falls, even if firm 2 prices at marginal cost. To the extent that firm 2 raises its price, that conclusion is reinforced. On the other hand, if the standalone price is not greater than the pre-bundling monopoly price, we can no longer conclude that consumer surplus has declined.
C. Effects on Entry and Exit
The result of firm 1's introduction of bundled rebates has, from one perspective, a dramatic impact on firm 2: rival firms are foreclosed from serving consumers who buy both A and B. Nevertheless, the model's assumptions imply much less stark effects in the long term. Given the assumption of perfect competition and constant marginal costs in market B, firms enter only when they have no fixed costs. To the extent that there are consumers who buy only in market B, rival firms still operate in the B market and earn normal profit. Thus for this model, bundled rebates have no additional adverse impact on competition given the potential for entry.
In fact, as discussed above, if the B market is a duopoly prior to the introduction of bundled rebates, and firms cannot distinguish A-and-B consumers from B-only consumers, then the use of bundled 24 An equivalent assumption would be that there are no consumers that purchase only B.
rebates increases profits not only for firm 1 but also for its rival. Taking this one step further, suppose that firm 1 initially has a monopoly in markets A and B, and faces a potential entrant in market B. Absent bundling, the prospect of intense competition deters entry whenever the potential entrant has positive entry costs. If firm 1 uses bundled rebates, however, the potential entrant will earn positive operating profit and thus enters when it has sufficiently small entry costs. Thus, while bundled rebates foreclose an entrant from part of the market, such a pricing strategy may induce entry by increasing the profits available to the potential entrant.
V. SMITHKLINE RECONSIDERED 
VI. BUNDLED DISCOUNTS AND NONLINEAR PRICES
We assumed above that positive consumer surplus exists in market A at the monopoly price. We deferred discussion of two-part tariffs and other types of nonlinear prices, partly on grounds of convenience. In some cases, two part tariffs may allow the monopolist to extract consumer surplus in market 1 completely. However, total surplus extraction is unlikely to be feasible in most cases.
31
Consistent with this is the fact that bundled discounts are often used without an entry fee, e.g. the SmithKline case discussed above. In this section we demonstrate that optimal nonlinear prices often leave positive expected consumer surplus, and that linking markets via a loyalty discount program enhances profits, even when a monopolist otherwise can offer separate nonlinear prices for each good. 29 As the Court noted, "So long as its price on Kefzol was equal to or not much higher than Smith-Kline's, Lilly counted on its reputation with physicians (particularly surgeons) and the reluctance of hospitals to suffer a decline in rebates (as compared with the rebates previously received under the CSP) because of their failure to participate in the Revised CSP, as a strategy to achieve its domination (goal of 75%) of the cefazolin market." Opinion, paragraph 101. 30 The Third Circuit Court, which affirmed the lower court decision on appeal, came closer to the standard advocated here. The decisive factor in that opinion was that more competition, and with it lower prices, would have prevailed but for the bundled rebate scheme. 575 F. 2nd 1056 (3d Cir 1978 31 See the analysis in Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003) as well as Mathewson and Winter (1997) .
Suppose that a consumer's demand curve depends on a binary random variable, which can be "low" (L) or "high" (H) with equal probability. Let In market A, however, firm 1 has monopoly power and can design nonlinear prices that discriminate between the two consumer types, subject to incentive-compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR) constraints. For intuitive appeal, think of nonlinear prices as sets of optional two-part tariffs. Let
denote the consumer surplus of a type i consumer in market k who faces a twopart tariff with entry fee E and usage charge P. The consumer knows the realized state of nature at the time of contracting, but firm 1 does not.
Firm 1 sets the two-part tariffs for A in order to: T and H T to maximize expected profits, subject to two incentive compatibility constraints (IC) and two indiv idual rationality constraints (IR).
subject to:
The right hand side of the individual rationality constraints sums the consumer surplus achieved by purchasing A at the standalone price (or foregoing A altogether) and the consumer surplus generated by buying B from a rival of firm 1. Since the optimal unbundled prices in (5) - (8) are a feasible outcome of the bundling problem, the monopolist earns higher profits by bundling than by using optimal unbundled two-part tariffs, given the ex ante information constraint. In terms of an upper bound on profits, from (IR') consumer surplus for each type must be at least as large as would be obtained by buying only product B at marginal cost. This implies that the bundled profits cannot exceed the entire surplus from each type in market A. Thus, the gain to bundling is at most the difference between consumer surplus in the A market at marginal cost pricing and the ex ante unbundled monopoly profits in the A market. This result formally establishes the intuition that the gains to bundled loyalty discounts are limited to what could be gained by improved nonlinear pricing in the monopoly market. This discussion has demonstrated that whether prices are linear or nonlinear, bundling can improve profits by expanding the scope for nonlinear pricing into market B.
32 The necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a separating solution to the bundled nonlinear pricing problem is that there exist positive numbers e A and e B that satisfy:
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VII. MODEL 2: IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN THE LINKED MARKET
The clean-cut nature of our welfare results thus far has depended on the assumption that market B features homogeneous goods. In this section, we relax this assumptio n and suppose that market B is served by duopolists that compete in a differentiated product environment. As we will show, the equivalence between tying and bundled rebates evaporates in this setting as bundled rebates take on additional facets of price discrimination. Of the unit population of consumers in the B market, a fixed fraction , θ uniformly distributed on the unit interval, also consume A. Thus, some A consumers prefer to buy B from firm 1 and others prefer to buy B from firm 2. As we show below, not all A consumers will buy B from firm 1 in order to obtain a discount on A. Some A-and-B consumers prefer firm 2's product so strongly that they will pay the (higher) standalone price for A. We assume that all A consumers buy B, either from firm 1 or from firm 2.
In effect, there are two consumer segments: θ that have positive utility for both A and B, and θ − 1 that have positive utility only for B.
As before, we denote the price of A in the bundle by 
A. Pre-Bundling
Prior to bundling, firm 1 charges the monopoly price of A, 
Note from (11) and (12) that prior to bundling, prices in B are set without regard to market A, and that firm 1's optimal price of A does not depend on the prices for B. Therefore, in equilibrium, firm 1 charges the monopoly price for A, and both firms set the Hotelling prices in B, that is if
B. Bundled loyalty discounts
With bundled pricing, the A and B markets interact. With these definitions, firm 1's profit when it offers a bundled discount program is 
As a preliminary matter, note that the standalone price of A plays a different role with bundling than it did in Model 1. In Model 1, the only function of the standalone price is to induce consumers of A and B to buy sole ly via the discount program. This explains the equivalence of bundled discounts and tying in Model 1. A P plays a similar role in Model 2, but it is also a price at which some sales may occur, to A consumers who have a strong preference for firm 2 in the B market. If A P is set to make 0 = A Q outside the bundle, some consumers may still buy B from firm 2. Hence, firm 1 does better by setting A P low enough that it can profit from selling A to consumers with strong preferences for firm 2 (t close to 1).
Comparing 1 P to * P , intuition suggests that for bundled discounts to be profitable, the program price of B must be higher than the price of B when there is no bundling. Firm 2's incentives are changed, however. Instead of just competing for the θ − 1 B-only consumers, firm 2 can also attract some A-and-B consumers away from the bundle. By setting A P high enough, firm 1 takes from firm 2 customers that preferred firm 2 to firm 1 prior to bundling, but with bundling switch to firm 1 in order to avoid paying a high standalone price for A. Firm 2 may lower its price to compete against such a strategy. (1) Nash equilibrium pricing involves bundling.
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From Theorem 3, the standalone price A P must exceed the bundle price of A, but unlike in Model 1, it is not set to induce zero consumption. This is because firm 1 realizes that some A consumers have such a strong preference for firm 2 that it is not worth lowering 1 P in order to induce them to buy the bundle. Realizing that consumers located close to firm 2 will buy B from firm 2, firm 1 can still earn profit from such consumers by selling them A at a standalone price set between the monopoly price and the choke price. The result implies that bundled discounts are not equivalent to tie-in sales, as they were in Model 1. The standalone price acts not only to induce consumers to choose the bundle, but is part of a price discrimination device for a population of A consumers with heterogeneous tastes for B. A-and-B consumers with a preference for firm 1 in the B market purchase A at price
consumers who strongly prefer firm 2 pay
We have no general results that compare the equilibrium prices of B in the bundling regime to the pre-bundling price of B. We gain some insight by treating the standalone and bundle prices of A as exogenous variables and examine their effect on the equilibrium levels of 1 P and 2 P in the B market.
To do this, it is convenient to simplify. Let 
Thus, suppose that a "small" bundled discount A ε is given by raising A P slightly above 
P to attract A-and-B consumers that prefer its brand of B.
This approach is limited because the bundle and standalone prices of A are not optimal. To explore further, we assume specific linear demand curves and study simulations of the Nash equilibria of the pricing game with bundling: firm 1 chooses A P , A ε , and 1 P , and firm 2 chooses 2 P . Table One fixes the differentiation parameter k and focuses on how ?, the proportion of A-and-B consumers, affects equilibrium pricing. 33 When there is no bundling, changes in θ do not alter the equilibrium values of 1 P , 2 P , and A P . In contrast, θ affects all prices when bundled discounts are introduced. As θ rises, firm 1's price of B increases, while firm 2's price falls. At the same time, the bundle price of A and the standalone price of A both fall. The unifying intuition is that for high values of θ , more A-and-B consumers prefer firm 2's brand of B and, therefore, can be induced to forego the bundled discount. This causes firm 1 to reduce the bundle price Table Two reports the welfare impacts of bundling. Aggregate net consumer surplus and producer surplus both rise in each of our simulations. Note that without bundling, firm 1's profit increases with θ , even though prices do not change. This is simply because increasing θ expands the size of the A market.
A second set of simulations reported in Tables Three and Four consumers located closer to firm 1 are now less likely to switch to ( ) 2 , P P A with a higher k than with a low k, the discount A ε on the bundle price of A falls slightly, so that bundle customers pay more for A when k increases. 33 We assume demands are described by Table Four describes the associated welfare effects. Interestingly, they are qualitatively different from the effect of varying θ for a fixed value of k. With k = 5, consumer surplus and total surplus rise due to bundling. While producer surplus for firm 1 rises, firm 2's surplus and overall producer surplus decline. With 6, k = this pattern continues, but the rise in consumer surplus is so small and the reduction in producer surplus so large that total surplus falls. Finally, with 7, k = firm 1's profits are considerably higher, but consumer surplus and firm 2's surplus fall so much due to bundling that total surplus falls.
From Table Four , it is clear that the efficiency-enhancing view of bundled discounts given by Table Two is not a general result. If consumers of B are not too price sensitive (due to large k), then a bundled rebate more efficiently extracts surplus from A-and-B customers. In addition, because firm 2 is less likely to attract A-and-B customers away from firm 1's discount program as k increases, firm 2's equilibrium price with bundling approaches its equilibrium price in the independent pricing case.
The analysis thus far has assumed that firm 1 offers a single price in market B to both bundle and non-bundle consumers. If that assumption is relaxed (and replaced with an assumption that consumers cannot resell B purchases), simulations of the resulting equilibrium change qualitatively in only one respect. Theorem 3 still applies, so that firm 1 lowers the loyalty program price for A while raising the standalone price for A and the program price for B. Meanwhile firm 2 lowers its price for B from the nonbundling equilibrium price. The only substantive change is that firm 1 offers a price for B to non-bundled consumers that is along the Hotelling reaction curve. Given that firm 2 prices below the Hotelling equilibrium price, firm 1 responds with a price that exceeds firm 2's price, but is less than the price in the unbundled equilibrium. In the simulations we have examined, consumers that forego the bundled rebate pay lower prices for A and B and are better off relative to the equilibrium when firm 1 charges a single price in market B, while bundled rebate participants are harmed. The general welfare effects of bundling remain ambiguous.
The ambiguous welfare results in Model 2 generally preclude using the price tests that emerged from Model 1. There is one case, however, in which a result from Model 1 carries over to the present setting. Suppose that (i) firm 1 offers separate bundle and non-bundle prices for B, (ii) as in Theorem 1, the standalone price for A remains at the unbundled monopoly price, and (iii) firm 2's price for B falls.
For this case, consumer welfare must increase relative to the equilibrium with independent pricing even though A-and-B consumers pay more for B.
34 Thus, if firm 2's price falls and firm 1's standalone price is no higher than it's pre-bundling monopoly price, we have a safe harbor test, even in the Hotelling setting.
C. Effects on Entry and Exit
Entry and exit effects, however, may reverse this welfare benefit. Recall that in Model 1, with homogenous goods in market B and perfect competition (or duopolists unable to distinguish A-and-B
consumers from B-only consumers), the monopolist cannot use a bundled rebate to reduce entry or induce exit. While introducing a bundled rebate forecloses competitors from A-and-B consumers, it can increase the profits available to a rival in the B market. In contrast, in our differentiated products duopoly model, firm 2 earns positive profits in equilibrium which are reduced by firm 1's use of bundled rebates. If firm 2's profits net of fixed costs are positive in the equilibrium with independent pricing, but negative in the equilibrium with bundled rebates, then a bundled loyalty discount can induce exit. In Table 2 , if , 1 = θ this will happen if firm 2's fixed/entry cost is between 2.32 and 1.19. Similarly, a bundled rebate may deter entry that otherwise would occur.
35 Thus a bundled rebate scheme that enhances welfare in the short term (setting aside entry costs) will reduce welfare if the effect is to induce exit or prevent entry.
The ability of tying or bundling to act as an entry barrier is familiar from such papers as Whinston (1990), Carlton and Waldman (2002), and Nalebuff (2004a) . In the first two papers, the monopolist 34 Briefly, non-bundle customers clearly benefit. Bundle customers with 2 1 > t benefit because the price for B from firm 2 (their preferred provider) has fallen while the standalone price for A has not risen. The consumer at , 2 1 = t who buys the bundle and rejects an alternative that generates higher welfare than the unbundled equilibrium, must get higher welfare from the bundle. This implies that all consumers with 2 1 < t benefit from the introduction of a bundled loyalty discount. Thus welfare increases for all consumers. Without the separate market B price for unbundled customers of firm 1, the welfare effect for non-bundled customers and overall is ambiguous. 35 Consider, for example, the results reported in Table 2 . Bundled loyalty discounts deter entry (induce exit) whenever entry (fixed) costs fall between 2 π and 2 π .
commits to a tying strategy that changes the terms of competition in a manner that may deter potential entrants from competing head-to-head against the monopolist. In both of these papers tying benefits the monopolist only when it deters entry, and should be avoided by the monopolist if entry is inevitable.
Thus, these entry deterrence benefits rely critically on the monopolist's ability to commit to a tying strategy. The present analysis shares more in common with Nalebuff (2004a) in that bundling increases the monopolist's profits even when the competitor is in the market, and it is the potential entrant's anticipation that bundling is the monopolist's optimal pricing strategy that deters it from entering.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A main point of this article is that bundled rebates are not analyzed usefully based on the case law for predatory pricing. Not only are all prices typically above marginal cost, but anticompetitive effects may not require a short term profit sacrifice or a period of recoupment. Bundled rebates can generate anticompetitive effects, but they do so by confronting consumers with the choice between a collection of tied discount prices and unattractive standalone prices, all above cost.
The analogy to tying, however, does not fit bundled rebates especially well either. When the rivalrous market has homogeneous products (Model 1), equilibrium bundled rebates act as a tying arrangement (Theorem 2). When there is product differentiation in the rivalrous market (Model 2), bundled loyalty discount programs also provide a means to price discriminate between A-and-B consumers that prefer firm 1 and those that prefer firm 2. The standalone price of A has a price discrimination role quite apart from inducing consumers to choose the bundled price. This is unlike tying.
This brings us to the second main issue in this article: are there tests that distinguish good bundled rebates from bad? Although the Ortho and VAA/BA tests have their uses, the discussion above suggests that they should be used with care, if consumer welfare is a concern. In Model 1, where sellers in 36 Nalebuff's environment differs from ours in that his consumers have heterogeneous unit demands for A and for B. It should be emphasized that the competitive harm here arises from firm 1 being able to maintain a monopoly. As Tables 2 and 4 In Model 2, the pricing effects of bundling are complex and can raise or lower consumer and total welfare, even if the standalone price of A exceeds the pre-bundling monopoly price. The non-bundling firm is induced to lower its price, so in that sense a bundled loyalty discount introduced by the monopolist increases competition in the B market. On the other hand, the monopolist raises its price of B.
Furthermore, as the share of A-and-B consumers increases, both the standalone and bundled prices of A fall, as competition intensifies for A-and-B consumers with a preference for firm 2. Given the potential for influencing the entry/exit decisions of competitors, there do not appear to be simple tests for whether bundling has reduced welfare as there are when the market for B is perfectly competitive.
We conclude with a discussion of what our analysis implies about when bundled loyalty discounts should be held to violate antitrust laws. In Model 1, bundled discounts work because they are a form of price discrimination among A-and-B consumers. They do not affect the price that a B-only consumer pays, and their main impact is on the consumer surplus of those who buy both A and B.
Furthermore, if the monopolist can extract all surplus in the A market without bundling, then bundled rebates do not raise profits. Intuitively, bundled rebates achieve what improved nonlinear pricing would accomplish in the monopoly market. Because the bundling firm is a monopolist in A, one might argue that doing a better job of extracting surplus from a rightly earned monopoly should not be an antitrust offence.
On the other hand, using a competitive market to extract monopoly rents may raise price to consumers that do not purchase the monopoly good, as well as generate deadweight losses in the competitive market that exceed the deadweight losses generated by a monopolist that does not link markets.
Model 2 has more complex implications for antitrust. Because bundled discounts can induce exit or deter entry, they have the potential to be anti-competitive by most mainstream interpretations of Section 2. Even without any exit or entry effects in Model 2, bundled discounts affect the welfare of Bonly consumers. However, the conditions that determine whether aggregate consumer welfare rises or falls are subtle and likely hard to measure in practice. This suggests that prospective antitrust enforcement for bundled discounts is difficult. Hence, in most cases enforcement probably should be based on actual market effects that can be traced to bundled discounts, rather than on forecasted effects. 
APPENDIX

Proof of Pareto Improvement Theorem
Proof.
1.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are customers. This proves (5). The deadweight loss at the optimal loyalty discount ( ) The last term is equal to zero at * 2 1 
Proof of Corollary of 1: Linear Demand
Although the no-bundling prices are feasible for each firm, they do not satisfy the first-order conditions for firm 1 (or firm 2). This demonstrates that a no-bundling set of prices cannot be a Nash equilibrium of Model 2. This proves part (1) of the Theorem. 
Denote ( ) ( )
